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Suffer if the Two are Combined?
I. INTRODUCTION
Faced with the ominous possibility of spending almost $1.7 trillion on
health care by the year 2000, American policymakers are finally tackling
health care reform.1 Exponential increases in the cost of health care,2
combined with the fact that there are 37 million uninsured Americans make
this a difficult task. 3 President Clinton and leaders in both political parties
have tossed their solutions to the health care dilemma into the legislative
arena.
4
While there has been little consensus, the trend toward "managed care"
has emerged as a workable solution to the health care dilemma.5 "Managed
I Elaine Lu, Recent Development, The Potential Effect of Managed Competition in
Health Care on Provider Liabilty and Patient Autonomy, 30 HARV. J. LEGIs. 519, 521
(1993).
2 In 1965, health care costs only made up about 6% of the Gross National Product
(GNP). By 1980, the figure had risen to 9.3% and now health care comprises almost 14% of
the GNP. Health care costs in the U.S. rose from $839 billion in 1992 to an estimated $940
billion in 1993. David B. Simpson, Compulsory Arbitration: An Instrument of Medical
Malpractice Reform and a Step Towards Reduced Health Care Costs?, 17 SErON HAi LEGIS.
J. 457, 457 (1993).
3 Gina Kolata, Will U.S. Be Healthier? Maybe Not, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 17,
1993, at 1-1.
4 In light of the new congressional leadership, health care industry officials expect
federal reforms to be minimal. Health Care Industry Responds to the GOP Takeover, HEALTH
LINE (Nov. 15, 1994). However in the last term, the leading Republican proposal for reform
was sponsored by Senator John H. Chafee (R-RI). Chafee's individual mandate proposal
would require every individual to have health insurance by 2005, with subsidies phased in
over the next 10 years to help the poor. The plan would include changes in the tax code which
would force many Americans into health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Also included in
the plan is a provision requiring the use of an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) method to
resolve malpractice disputes. Opposed by the Republicans are President Clinton's plan, which
proposes managed competition in the form of purchasing co-ops, and Representative
McDermott's (D-WA) single payer plan. Health Care Reform: Crunch ime for Congress,
NEwSDAY, May 29, 1994, at A39.
5 Right now, managed care comprises 28.6% of the health care providers' market, but
with its current rate of growth, it will comprise 80% of the market within five years. Rorie
Sherman, Health Plan to Have a Major Legal Impact, 16 NAT'L L.J. 36 (1993). For more
information about managed care, see Clark C. Havighurst, Prospective Self Denial: Can
Consumers Contract Today to Accept Health Care Rationing Tomorrow?, 140 U. PA. L. REv.
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care is an umbrella term covering a wide range of cost-containment efforts
aimed at influencing clinical decision-making with a view to preventing
overutilization of services."6 Cost-containment efforts link providers'
decisions to their economic interests or to the interests of a health
maintenance organization (HMO). However these efforts may be completely
contrary to the provider's duty to make decisions on the basis of the
patient's medical interests. 7 Under managed care, health care providers8
make medical decisions within a cost-containment perspective, which is
predicted to increase the likelihood of patient harmY This will lead to more
medical malpractice litigation, which may increase the need for malpractice
reform. 10 As a result, almost all of the proposals for health care reform
address the need for malpractice reform, and many policymakers see
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as a viable solution.11 The focus of this
1755 (1992).
6 Havighurst, supra note 5, at 1775 n.50. Managed care takes several different forms:
health maintenance organizations (HMO), preferred provider organizations (PPO), and
utilization review. This Note will focus on HMOs. "An HMO is basically a prepaid health
insurance plan in which an organization accepts contractual responsibility for the delivery of a
stated range of health services to an enrolled population." WARREN GREENBERG,
COMPETITION, REGULATION, AND RATIONING IN HEALTH CARE 65 (1991).
7 Rand E. Rosenblatt, Primary Care Case Management, the Doctor-Patient Relationship,
and the Politics of Privatization, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 915, 933-34 (1986). In his recent
testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Dr. Clifton R. Cleaveland, President of the
American College of Physicians, testified that managed care organizations can put pressure on
physicians to more efficiently utilize resources by threatening to terminate their contracts with
physicians. Medical Malpractice and Antitrust Issues in Health Care Reform, Hearing Before
the Senate Comm on Finance, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994), available in LEXIS, Federal
News Service File (statement of Dr. Clifton R. Cleaveland, President of the American College
of Physicians) [hereinafter Health Care Reform Hearing].
8 This Author uses the term "health care provider" throughout the Note to encompass any
group of practitioners or individuals who provide health care to consumers, such as
physicians, nurses, optometrists, dentists, and other specialists.
9 In Wake of Reform, Use of ADR May Spread Beyond Malpractice Arena, Some
Predict, 2 HEALTH LAw REP. (BNA) No. 40, at D-2 (Oct. 14, 1993).
10 The medical malpractice system is already considered to be in a crisis state. It harms
the doctor-patient relationship and wastes time and money. See discussion infra Part U.A.
However, the costs attributed to medical malpractice are a relatively insignificant part of the
total health care bill. See Tort Reform Possible, But'Not a Big Health Care Money Saver,
Rivlin Says, 1 HEALTH CARE & POL'Y REP. (BNA) No. 30, at 1248 (Oct. 4, 1993)
[hereinafter Tort Reform Possible].
11 While the new Republican leadership has not indicated whether it supports arbitration
or other ADR methods of reforming the malpractice system, it has indicated specifically in
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Note is specifically on arbitration as a solution. 12
The purpose of this Note is to explore the use of medical malpractice
arbitration in the managed care setting. Part II examines the problems
within the current medical malpractice system and the benefits that
arbitration offers. This section also explains the statutory and common law
support for arbitration in the managed care setting. Part m describes how
Kaiser Permanente uses and enforces a mandatory arbitration provision in
each of its enrollment contracts, and discusses the problems specific to its
implementation. On a broader policy level, Part IV examines the contractual
and constitutional concerns regarding mandatory agreements to arbitrate in
the managed care setting. Part V will balance the benefits of arbitration
against the reality that agreements to arbitrate in the managed care setting
may further constrict consumers' choices and adversely affect their rights.
II. SUPPORT FOR AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS IN THE MANAGED CARE SETTING
Support for arbitration developed in response to the inefficiencies in the
current medical malpractice system. The high cost of litigation, in both time
and resources, has led members of both the legal and medical communities
to arbitration. The result is a list of benefits that purports to be the panacea
for the ailments malpractice system's.
A. Problems with the Current System
Although the cost of medical malpractice is not the only reason for the
high cost of health care, it is a prime target for reform."3 According to one
study, the frequency of medical malpractice claims has risen to one claim
per every three to four physicians. 14 Along with the high frequency of
their "Contract with America" a commitment to liability reform. Health Care Industry:
Responds to the GOP Takeover, HFALTH LINE (Nov. 15, 1994). Plans that were debated in
the last congressional session all required the use of an ADR method to resolve medical
malpractice disputes. See Kolata, supra note 3, at 1-1.
12 Arbitration is defined as a "process of dispute resolution in which a neutral third party
renders a decision after a hearing at which both parties have an opportunity to be heard."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 105 (6th ed. 1990).
13 According to Alice Rivlin, Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
medical malpractice costs are "not a big factor in the rising cost of health care." In fact,
medical malpractice only accounts for about 1% of the total health care costs. The best way to
control costs is to alter the way Americans pay for medical care. Tort Reform Possible, supra
note 10, at 1248.
14 Kirk B. Johnson et al., The American Medical Assocation Specialty Society Tort
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claims, the time spent in malpractice suits is a major concern. The average
time for a trial is two years, but a suit for a large award can take up to ten
years. 15 Because health care is considered a precious resource, wasting the
industry's time and money in litigation is not favored.
Another serious concern regarding the current medical malpractice
system is the phenomenon of defensive medicine. Defensive medicine
requires the use of redundant diagnostic tests and treatment procedures to
guard against medical malpractice liability. 16 According to the American
Medical Association (AMA); defensive medicine can be blamed for adding
as much as $15 billion to the nation's health care bill.17 Less conservative
estimates blame 30% of the total cost of health care on defensive
medicine.' 8 By any estimate, defensive medicine is a significant problem
which may be a direct result of the current medical malpractice system.
B. The Benefits of Arbitration
In the medical malpractice setting, arbitration will provide a number of
benefits over traditional litigation. Arbitration will: (1) be a more efficient
means to resolve disputes; (2) save money for both parties involved; (3)
save time for both parties and the court system; (4) limit the trauma a
malpractice dispute can inflict upon doctors and patients involved in a
claim; and (5) coincide with the cooperative contractual relationship
between doctors and patients.
1. Greater Efficiency
The use of a more qualified decisionmaker will make arbitration more
efficient than traditional litigation. 19 Most medical malpractice arbitration
panels include one medical care provider, one arbitrator selected by the
plaintiff, and one neutral arbitrator selected by both parties.20 Many
Reform Proposal, 1 CTS HEALTH Sci. & L. 6, 7 (1990).
15 id-
16 Simpson, supra note 2, at 460. See discussion infra Part Ill.B. about why physicians'
fears about malpractice liability may be irrational.
17 Simpson, supra note 2, at 460. In a 1992 Gallop poll of general practice physicians,
93 % of those surveyed revealed that the threat of medical malpractice liability caused them to
order tests they might not have otherwise considered necessary. Health Care Reform Hearing,
supra note 7.
18 Simpson, supra note 2, at 461.
19 Id. at 463-64.
20 Alicia Roberts, Alternative Dispute Resolution Takes Less Money, l1ime; So Arbitrate
or Negotiate-Just Don't Litigate, 5 MANAGED CARE OUTLOOK (Jan. 4, 1993).
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analysts believe that the inclusion of a medical care provider on an
arbitration panel provides a more effective decisionmaker than a jury,
because most jurors lack understanding of medical issues. 21 While weeks
may be spent simply educating a jury with a mass of medical facts and
issues required for the resolution of the case, 22 specialized triers of fact
already have the necessary medical knowledge needed to understand the
facts of the case. 23 As a general counsel for Kaiser put it, "[arbitration] is
just plain more manageable than the often-unruly court system. "24
2. Less Expensive
Arbitration can save money for both plaintiffs and defendants by
avoiding the expense of a trial. For a plaintiff, the cost of litigating a
medical malpractice claim may in many cases exceed the amount paid in
compensation to the injured plaintiff.25 Arbitration may save money for
health care providers by avoiding potentially high jury verdicts. 26 Many
believe that the typical jury has a tendency to "produce damage awards in
an economic vacuum, without reference to, or appreciation of, the effects of
excessive recoveries upon the economics of a health care system."27
Furthermore, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) recently found that
arbitration lowers defense costs for health care providers.28 Money saved
for health care providers will translate into savings for consumers. In fact,
managed care providers claim that arbitration helps keep consumer costs for
21 Johnson et al., supra note 14, at 8. But see Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving
Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury's Shadow, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 82-83
(1991) (stating that ontrary to popular opinion, doctors prevail most often in medical
malpractice suits and juries are reasonably competent decisionmakers).
22 Johnson et al., supra note 14, at 7.
23 Id.
24 Roberts, supra note 20.
25 Thomas B. Metzloff, Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategies in Medical
Malpractice, 9 ALAsKA L. REv. 429, 435 (1992).
26 There is a fear among many health care providers that juries will be swayed by
sympathy and give plaintiffs huge damage awards. See Roberts, supra note 20; see also Neil
D. Schor, Note, Health Care Providers and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Needed Medicine
to Combat Medical Malpractice Claims, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 65, 68 (1988); but
see Metzloff, supra note 25, at 434 (stating that juries are competent decisionmakers).
27 Simpson, supra note 2, at 458.
28 Issues Relating to Medical Malpractices, Before the Subcomm. on Health of the
House Ways & Means, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1993) (statement of Larry H. Thompson,
Asst. Comptroller General) [hereinafter Medical Malpractice].
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their health care plan affordable. 29
3. Less Time Consuming
Arbitration can also save time. According to a recent study, claims
resolved through arbitration take an average of nineteen months, as
compared to thirty-five months for litigation. 30 In California, a three-day
arbitration proceeding can replace a three-week trial. 31 A general counsel
for the HMO Maxicare, which uses a mandatory arbitration provision in its
enrollment contracts, explained that arbitration only "takes about an hour or
two to lay it out in front of the arbitrator." 32 Once the claims are resolved,
doctors can focus their attention on administering health care, rather than
worrying about malpractice suits.
4. Limits the Trauma to Doctors and Patients
The use of arbitration can also prevent the trauma which both health
care providers and plaintiffs must endure during a medical malpractice
trial. 33 Doctors often perceive a negligence claim as an allegation of near
criminal conduct. 34 The doctors experience a tremendous amount of guilt
and begin to lack confidence in their capabilities. For seriously injured
plaintiffs, the long hours of a trial may be difficult or impossible to
endure. 35
The goal of medical malpractice liability is to insure a high level of
care, protect patients, and compensate victims of negligence. 36 Arbitration
can accomplish these goals without the trauma of a trial. Arbitration is a
private process that is capable of awarding damages to an injured plaintiff
and ensuring adequate care. 37
29 Roberts, supra note 20.
30 Medical Malpractice, supra note 28, at 20.
31 Roberts, supra note 20.
32 Id.
33 Metzloff, supra note 25, at 435-36.
34 Id. at 435.
35 Id. at 436 n.28.
36 See Sylvia A. Law, A Consumer Perspective on Medical Malpractice, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoBS. 305, 310 (1986).
37 See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Physicians' Point of View Concerning Medical
Malpractice: A Sociological Perspective of Tort Reform, 23 GA. L. REv. 295, 320-23 (1989).
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5. Coincides with the Cooperative Contractual Relationship Between
Doctors and Patients
The adversarial system is at odds with the relationship of cooperation
between doctors and patients that is vital to the provision of adequate
medical care.38 The doctor-patient relationship is based on trust, while the
adversarial system is based on distrust. Arbitration, without the long
discovery process and publicity, fosters a more cooperative atmosphere for
resolving disputes. 39 A contractual agreement to arbitrate may also be more
compatible with the contractual relationship between doctors and patients. 40
C. Statutory Support for Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims
The general policy in all fifty states supports arbitration. 41 Fifteen
states specifically address how arbitration agreements should be used to
resolve medical malpractice claims. 42 Michigan had a program to insure that
the option of arbitration is offered to patients at the time they receive health
care from a health care provider. 43 Such an agreement can be enforced even
if it is signed by the patient prior to receiving care. 44 Pretreatment
38 Johnson et al., supra note 14, at 7-8.
39 . Metzloff, supra note 25, at 440. The problem with arbitration is that it does entail
compromise. When both parties enter a medical malpractice action they both desire
vindication. The plaintiff wants to punish the health care provider for harming her and the
defendant wants to be cleared of all wrongdoing. Yet, compromise decisions do not vindicate
either party. Id.
40 Carl M. Stevens, Medical Malpractice: Some Implications of Contract and Arbitration
in HMOs, 59 HEALTH & Soc'y 59, 62 (1981).
41 NANCY K. BANNON, AMA TORT REFORM COMPENDIUM 11 (1989). Currently,
medical malpractice claims can be arbitrated in most states under the general arbitration
statutes of those states.
42 Those states that have specifically addressed medical malpractice in their arbitration
statutes are: Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maine, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia. Id. at 11-17.
43 MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 600.5040-.5065 (1979) (repealed). During the fourteen years
that the Michigan plan was in effect, 985 claims were filed. Of these claims, the time from
claim filing to claim closing was significantly shorter than regular litigation. Medical
Malpractice, supra note 28, at 19.
44MICH. COMP. LAWs §§ 600.5040-.5065 (1979) (repealed). Other state statutes still
allow pretreatment arbitration agreements. See COLO. REV. STAT. 13-64-403 (1994);
AlAsKA STAT. § 9.55, 535 (1994) (allowing pretreatment agreements, but the agreement must
not be a prerequisite to receiving care).
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agreements are also allowed in California and New York.45 The New York
statute specifically allows the use of arbitration agreements in HMOs and
other managed care enrollment contracts. 46 These statutes create a fertile
legal landscape for mandatory arbitration agreements in the managed care
setting.
D. Common Law Support for Arbitration of Medical Malpractice
Claims in the Managed Care Setting
As a general rule, courts enforce arbitration agreements in the managed
care setting.47 In Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, the California
Supreme Court held that "an agent or representative, contracting for
medical services [with an HMO] on behalf of a group of employees has
implied authority to agree to arbitration of malpractice claims of enrolled
employees arising under the contract. "48 The plaintiff, a state employee who
was covered under Kaiser's group health plan, brought a malpractice suit
against Kaiser. The plaintiff claimed that she was not bound by the
arbitration agreement because she had no knowledge of the agreement; that
it was a contract of adhesion; and that it violated her right to a jury trial.
The court rejected all three arguments. 49
45 Any contract for medical services which contains a provision for arbitration of any
dispute as to professional negligence of a health care provider shall have such provision as the
first article of the contract and shall be expressed in the following language:
It is understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice, that is as to whether any medical
services rendered under this contract were unnecessary or unauthorized or were improperly,
negligently, or incompetently rendered, will be determined by submission to arbitration as
provided by California law, and not by a lawsuit or resort to court process except as
California law provides for judicial review of arbitration proceedings. Both parties to this
contract, by entering into it, are giving up their constitutional right to have any such dispute
decided in a court of law before a jury, and instead are accepting the use of arbitration.
CAL. Civ. PRAC. CODE § 1295(a) (West 1994). See also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 4406(a)
(McKinney 1986).
46 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4406(a) (McKinney 1986). See also BANNON, supra note
41, at 15.
47 See Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976); see also Doyle v.
Giuliucci, 40 P.2d I (Cal. 1965); Dutel v. Travelers Health Network of La., Inc., 1993 WL
62387, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 2, 1993); Marciniak v. Amid, 412 N.W.2d 248 (Mich. Ct. App.
1987).
48 Madden, 552 P.2d at 1180.
4 9 Id., 522 P2d at 1181.
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On August 1, 1971, the plaintiff had a hysterectomy at a Kaiser
hospital, during which her bladder was punctured and blood transfusions
were required. 50 From the blood transfusions, plaintiff developed serum
hepatitis.51 Plaintiff, unaware of the new arbitration provision enacted in
May 1971, filed suit against Kaiser and the blood banks.52 The trial court
denied Kaiser's motion to compel arbitration and Kaiser appealed. 53 On
appeal, the California Supreme Court compelled arbitration. The court held
that it was within the scope of authority of an agent to bind employees to an
agreement to arbitrate medical malpractice claims.54 The court relied on
section 2319 of the California Civil Code, which authorizes a general agent
"[tlo do everything necessary or proper and usual" for the purpose of
serving as an agent. 55 Furthermore, the court, relying on the fact that
arbitration is an accepted means of resolving malpractice disputes,
concluded that arbitration was within the "proper and usual" guidelines of
the statute.56
The court disagreed with the plaintiff's claim that the arbitration
agreement was a contract of adhesion. According to the court, the Kaiser
plan represented the product of negotiation between two parties "possessing
parity of bargaining strength."57 By definition, in a contract of adhesion,
the weaker party has no opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract
with the stronger party.58
The court also rejected the plaintiffs claim that the Kaiser arbitration
agreement violated her constitutional right to a jury trial.59 The court
implied a waiver of the right to a jury trial from the agreement to
arbitrate. 60 For its reasoning, the court relied on the regular enforcement of
5 0 Maddn, 522 P.2d at 1181.
51 id.
52 It is not disputed that the Kaiser plan did not contain an arbitration provision at the
time the patient enrolled. The provision was added at a subsequent date without the
knowledge of the patient, who claimed not to have received the revised contract in the mail.
ld.
51 Id. at n.4.
54 Id. at 1182.
5 5 Madden, 522 P.2d at 1182.
56id.
57Id. at 1185. While it may be true that the patient's agent and Kaiser were on equal
bargaining terms, the court fails to address the fairness concerns with the arbitration process
itself.
58 Id.
5 9 Id. at 1187.
60 Madden, 552 P.2d at 1187 n.12 (California Code of Civil Procedure, section 631,
recognizes implied waiver of a right to a jury trial by failure to request a jury or to post jury
425
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arbitration agreements found in labor and commercial contracts which do
not expressly contain waivers of the right to a jury trial. 61
Other state courts have followed Madden and upheld arbitration
provisions in managed care contracts. 62 In Leong v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the arbitration provision
in an HMO contract was not a contract of adhesion. 63 The court reasoned
that in a contract of adhesion, the stronger party uses oppressive terms to
try to limit its obligations and liability.64 The court held an arbitration
provision, does not limit the obligations of the HMO, but "merely
substitutes one forum for another." 65
The benefits of arbitration combined with the statutory and common-
law support for arbitration of medical malpractice disputes creates a strong
argument for arbitration's expansive use. Yet, arbitration, particularly in the
managed care setting, is not without its flaws.
III. THE KAISER EXAMPLE
A. The Enrollment Contract and the Agreement to Arbitrate
Arbitrating medical malpractice claims is not an idea born out of the
recent health care crisis. Since 1972, Kaiser Permanente, the world's largest
health maintenance organization, has mandated the use of arbitration in all
of its enrollment contracts. 66 Kaiser is a managed care leader and a model
for health care reform. 67 Over 6.6 million of its members in sixteen states68
are bound to arbitrate any future claims on any legal theory they may have
fees).
61 Madden, 552 P.2d at 1187 n.12.
62 See Leong v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 788 P.2d 164 (Haw. 1990); Wilson v. Kaiser
Found. Hosps., 190 Cal. Rptr. 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Marciniak v. Amid, 412 N.W.2d
248 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
63 788 P.2d at 166.
64 Id. at 169.
65 Id. (quoting Madden, 552 P.2d at 1186).
66 Joseph T. McLaughlin et al., Alternate Dispute Resolution, C380 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 513,
531 (Feb. 1, 1989).
6 7 Martha Groves, Ailing Health Care System May Get Kaiser-Syle Cure, L.A. TIMES,
May 10, 1993, at A-1. See also KAISER PERMANENTE, KAISER PERMANENTE HEALTH CARE
FOR LIFE (1993) (This pamphlet can be obtained by writing directly to Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan, Inc., 1950 Franklin Street, Oakland, CA 94612.). Following Kaiser's lead,
Maxicare Health Plans, another HMO, began using binding arbitration in 1973. It now uses
arbitration in four states. Roberts, supra note 20.
68 Groves, supra note 67, at A-1.
[Vol. 10:2 1995]
ARBITRATION, MANAGED CARE AND CONSUMERS
against a Kaiser hospital, doctor, or facility. Kaiser's experience with
mandatory arbitration in medical malpractice may provide some valuable
guidance as to how arbitration in a managed health care system would work.
Kaiser primarily provides care through health maintenance
organizations. "An HMO is basically a prepaid health insurance plan in
which an organization accepts contractual responsibility for the delivery of a
stated range of health services to an enrolled population." 69 Nationwide
enrollment in HMOs has grown almost as fast as the cost of health care. In
1980, there were only 9.1 million HMO members, but by 1989, the number
soared to 32.4 million.70 Membership growth in HMOs can be attributed to
their ability to provide affordable health care. Providers are able to cut costs
by employing closed panels of full-time physicians and by contracting with
consumers to cover only care rendered by their providers. 71 An HMO that
uses a closed panel has employed physicians who agree to cooperate in the
HMO's cost containment strategy and will provide services to its
enrollees. 72 In this way the HMO can achieve its goal of efficiency by
involving providers directly in the cost-containment effort, thus eliminating
the need to contract with the enrollee to provide fewer services. 73
B. The Process
Kaiser's arbitration process consists of a panel of three arbitrators. 74
One arbitrator is selected by Kaiser and the other arbitrator is selected by
the patient/member. Most often the arbitrator chosen by Kaiser is a medical
expert or medical care provider. 75 The two arbitrators then select a third
arbitrator, who is deemed the neutral member. 76 Costs are shared between
the two parties and the decision is binding.77
Kaiser's arbitration provision is a binding process that can conclusively
69 HMOs fall under the managed care cost containment umbrella. GREENBERG, supra
note 6, at 65. Membership in an HMO is a contractual agreement. Usually employers contract
with HMOs to provide a health care package for their employees. Yet, individuals without
employee health insurance may also contract with an HMO.
70 id.
71 Havighurst, supra note 5, at 1779. See also GREENBERG, supra note 6, at 65-68.
72 Havighurst, supra note 5, at 1781.
73 Id.; cf. Rosenblatt, supra note 7, at 933-34. See also discussion supra Part I.
74 McLaughlin et al., supra note 66, at 532.
75 This is common for medical malpractice. The presence of a medical expert is said to
expedite the resolution of the dispute by avoiding the requirement to dispense cumbersome
medical information to the decisionmakers. See discussion supra Part ll.B. 1.
76 McLaughlin et al., supra note 66, at 533.
77 id.
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resolve disputes. Judicial review is limited and arbitration decisions can be
challenged on only two levels. First, due process or jurisdiction, the
plaintiff may appeal to the district court.78 Second, on traditional contract,
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may also provide an avenue for
judicial review.79 The agreement to arbitrate is incorporated into a five page
application for the membership/medical questionnaire form.80 It appears in a
grey box, just above the signature line. It is printed in inconspicuous type
and is not in bold face type. It reads as follows:
I understand that the Service Agreement provides that all claims
arising from alleged violation of any duty incident to the Service
Agreement with Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, including any claim for
medical or hospital negligence or for premises liability, irrespective of the
legal theory asserted, are subject to arbitration. 81
C. Problems with the Provision
There are several problems with Kaiser's provision to arbitrate. The
most troubling is that arbitration is never defined in any of the material
provided by Kaiser.82 Consumers should be informed that by signing this
contract, they are committed to resolving any dispute with Kaiser, including
medical malpractice, through binding arbitration. 83 The contract should
78 Irving Ladimer et al., Experience in Medical Malpractice Arbitration, 2 J. LEGAL
MED. 433, 439 (1981). For example, proven bias on the arbitration panel may be appealable.
Yet, the lack of notice or understanding of the agreement to arbitrate is not sufficient to
preclude arbitration. See, e.g., Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976).
79 Lauren K. Saunders, The Quest for Balance: Public Policy and Due Process in
Medical Malpractice Arbitration Agreements, 23 HARv. J. LEGIs. 267, 271 (1986). For
example, the courts will not uphold a contract of adhesion if it is given to patients on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis under conditions where the patients cannot obtain the desired service
elsewhere. See Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, 840 P.2d 1013 (Ariz. 1992).
8 0 KAISER PERMANENTE, KAISER PERMANENTE APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP -
MEDICAL QUESTIONAIRE 5 (rev. 10-06-93) [hereinafter MEMBERSHIP].
81 Id.
82 The only further information that the booklet gives on arbitration is the following:
"[A]ll claims arising from alleged violation of any duty incident to your agreement with
Health Plan, including any claim for medical or hospital negligence or for premises liability,
irrespective of the legal theory asserted, are subject to arbitration." KAISER PERMANENTE,
DIscLosuRE FORM AND EVIDENCE OF CoNrrAcr 34 (1993).
83 For more information about the importance of educating consumers before they sign
binding arbitration agreements, see Law, supra note 36, at 316-18. See also Jacqueline R.
Baum, Note, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: A Patient's Perspective, 61 WASH. U. L.Q.
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specify that by signing the agreement, the consumer is waiving her right to
a jury trial. An effective standard for a clear and fair arbitration agreement
can be found in a California statute for HMOs. 84 The language of the
arbitration agreement should not be such that an ordinary person would
expect a jury trial. 85 Hence, a fair agreement to arbitrate should define
arbitration and its effect on the consumer's rights in language an ordinary
person would understand.
Another problem with the contract is that it is signed before the parties
know all of the facts, but does not give either party the right to rescind.
Statutes in many states allow consumers the right to cancel an arbitration
agreement after signing it.86 The right to rescind in the managed care setting
can be particularly important. At the point of contracting for prepaid health
care, consumers cannot foresee what type of care they may need in the
future. 87 If they happen to develop a serious illness, they may not want to
be bound to arbitrate. 88 Also, because consumer choice for providers is
limited due to the nature of the HMO, a consumer who is less comfortable
with their provider may not want to be bound to arbitrate. 89 Ideally,
123 (1983) (contending that patients are inadequately protected).
84 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1995); but see CAL. Civ. PROC.
CODE § 1295(t) (Health care service plans may be exempt from provisions a, b, & c, which
require that arbitration be defined and explained. However, such health care service plans
must have a procedure for notifying prospective subscribers that the plan has an arbitration
provision.).
85 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-
403(4) (%Vest 1994) (requiring notice of arbitration be printed in ten-point bold-faced type).
86 See ALASKA STAT. § 9.55.535(c) (1994) (30 day revocation period); CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 1295(c) (West 1995); COLO. R-v. STAT. ANN. § 13-64-403(3) (West 1994)
(90 days); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10, para. 209(c) (1992) (60 days); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4235(1) (Vest 1993) (30 days); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.12 (Michie 1992) (60 days).
Though most of these statutes limit the time a party may rescind the arbitration agreement,
they still allow that right. See infra note 146.
87 Contra William H. Ginsberg et al., Contractual Revisions to Medical Malpractice
Liability, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 253, 256 (Spring 1986) (arguing that an HMO
enrollment contract is the best time to sign an arbitration clause because the patient is not sick
and can make a decision with "full freedom of choice").
88 Even without a serious illness, consumers may not want to arbitrate. According to an
extensive study in Michigan, consumers are generally reluctant to agree to arbitrate medical
malpractice claims. Fourteen years ago, Michigan designed a program to make patients aware
of the arbitration option, but few patients selected arbitration. Out of the 20,000 claims that
were filed for medical malpractice, only 985 had filed for arbitration. See Medical
Malpractice, supra note 28, at 19.
89 But see Havighurst, supra note 5, at 1787-89. Havighurst is a strong supporter of
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arbitration should be an agreement between two parties of equal bargaining
power. Yet, the inability to rescind the agreement combined with the lack of
knowledge regarding their future medical needs, leaves consumers at a
considerable disadvantage.
The third problem with the agreement is that it fails to specify that the
arbitration is binding. It is important to note that in prior Kaiser contracts,
the word "binding" is explicitly stated. 90 A consumer's only indication that
the arbitration is binding would come from a study of case law. 91
Therefore, "binding" should not only be defined, but also included.
IV. LEGAL CONCERNS OF ARBITRATING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS IN THE MANAGED CARE SETTING
The ambiguities of the Kaiser agreement can be resolved by simply
defining arbitration and clarifying other words in the contract. However,
resolving the legal concerns of arbitrating in the managed care environment
is not as simple. There are two primary areas of concern: contractual and
constitutional.
A. Contractual Concerns
Arbitration agreements in managed care enrollment contracts may be
against public policy because they are contracts of adhesion. A contract of
adhesion gives the weaker party to an agreement no realistic choice as to its
terms. 92 It is a take-it-or-leave-it situation.93
By the very nature of the current health care crisis, consumers may be
forced to accept an arbitration provision in an HMO enrollment contract in
managed care. He believes that consumer choice has not been a helpful source of rationing
precious health care resources. Thus, he supports voluntary limits on patients' choices as used
in HMOs. Id.
90 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, THE IMPACT OF AIDS ON
THE KAISER PERMANENTE MEDICAL CARE PROGRAM (Northern California Region) 28-29 (July
1988) (displaying Kaiser's Application for Membership - Medical Questionaire Form from
1987).
91 See Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976); Wilson v. Kaiser
Found. Hosps., 190 Cal.Rptr. 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Leong v. Kaiser Found. Hosps.,
788 P.2d 164 (Haw. 1990).
92 Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosps., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
93 See id. An adhesion contract is "offered to consumers of goods and services on
essentially a 'take it or leave it' basis without affording the consumer a realistic opportunity to
bargain and under such conditions that the consumer cannot obtain the desired product or
services except by acquiescing in the form contract." Id.
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order to receive affordable health care. There are over 37 million Americans
who are currently uninsured.94 The profile of these Americans without
insurance is strikingly similar to the consumer profile of HMO members.
Both groups are younger and employed at organizations with 500 or fewer
employees. 95 Small employers are less likely to be able to offer health
insurance to their employees. 96 For those without insurance through an
employer, an HMO may be their only affordable option to receive adequate
health care. It is unrealistic to think that these individuals, who are
desperate to obtain health care at a reasonable price, are in a fair bargaining
position with an HMO. This gives the HMOs an opportunity to exploit their
advantage and require consumers to either sign the arbitration provision or
forego health care. It is a clear form of economic adhesion. Such a contract
cannot be consensual, and arbitration without consent is disfavored by
everyone. 97 Economic factors and the lack of affordable choices should be
factored into the legislature's decision-making. Without such analysis, the
danger of forcing consumers into arbitration is great. Health care reform
may bring an end to the dire predicament of the uninsured, but reform may
amplify the concern about contracts of adhesion. For instance, if universal
coverage is combined with mandated arbitration of malpractice claims, then
more consumers may still be forced to accept an arbitration agreement in
order to receive health care. 98 Even if the new Republican-controlled
Congress adopts a less-intrusive plan for reform, the trend toward managed
care will likely continue, as the market adapts to provide affordable health
care to consumers. As managed care grows, the need to keep costs at a
minimum becomes more important, and arbitration is likely to play an even
greater role. Unfortunately for consumers who do not desire arbitration, the
market expansion of managed care may mean that Americans have to forego
a choice of forums in return for adequate health care.
On the other hand, some argue that the limited choice managed care
94 Kolata, supra note 3, at 1-1.
95 According to one study, the average HMO consumer is below 40 and is in the middle
to upper-middle class. The average uninsured American is also younger and largely middle
class. Most often he is employed at smaller businesses, where he is less likely to receive
health insurance through his employers. ROBERT G. SHOULDICE, INTRODUCTION TO
MANAGED CARE 235 (1991) (citing a Louis Harris & Associates study from 1984).
96 Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, 840 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Ariz. 1992).
97 See Broemmer, 840 P.2d at 1015 (holding that the agreement to arbitrate was not
enforceable because it was a contract of adhesion and was thus not voluntarily signed). See
also Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 783 (discussing characteristics of adhesion contracts); Law,
supra note 36, at 316-17.
98 See discussion supra Part I. (A Kaiser-like cure to the health care crisis is likely.).
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offers is the price consumers should pay for affordable health care. 99 Health
care with arbitration agreements is better than no health care at all.
Furthermore, an arbitrated ruling can be appealed to a district court if there
is gross injustice in the arbitration agreement itself.100 Policymakers must
weigh these positive aspects of arbitration with the reality that economics
may force consumers to agree to arbitration in order to receive health care.
B. Constitutional Concerns
Managed care agreements to arbitrate may unconstitutionally abridge
consumers' Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.10 1 Courts have skirted
around this issue by deeming arbitration agreements as an adequate waiver
of the right to a jury trial.102 Yet, a waiver is not adequate or constitutional
if consumers are economically coerced into signing an agreement to receive
health care. 103
In addition, consumers should not be forced to give up their right to a
jury trial merely because many health care providers are convinced that
arbitration is imperative to affordable health care. 104 Providers fear juries
and the jurors' perceived tendencies to sympathize with plaintiffs.105 This
fear is unsubstantiated by the fact that doctors prevail most often in
malpractice disputes. 106 In a five-year study on jury verdicts in medical
malpractice actions, the plaintiff prevailed only 29% of the time.' 07 When
judges decided the cases, plaintiffs won 50% of the time.10 8 Therefore, the
99 See Wilson, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 655. The court distinguished cases where arbitration
was not enforced on the grounds that the arbitration agreements were not provided by a
prepaid health care contract. Thus, it can be inferred that if an individual is in an HMO, she
has less right to oppose arbitration than one who is not in an HMO.
100 Saunders, supra note 76, at 271. "Gross injustice" would include problems with the
agreement itself such as fraud, duress, and unconscionability. Yet, an allegation of
nondisclosure or misunderstanding is not sufficient to vacate an arbitration award. See
Georgia Lamb v. Holy Cross Hosp., 148 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
101 U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
102 See Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 478 (Cal. 1976).
103 See discussion supra Part IV. A.
1o4 For evidence that medical care providers are convinced arbitration is necessary to
provide affordable health care, see Schor, supra note 26, at 67; See also Johnson et al., supra
note 14, at 7.
105 Johnson et al., supra note 14, at 7.
106 Metzloff, supra note 25, at 434.
107 Simpson, supra note 2, at 462 (citing Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin Clermont, Trial
by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1124 (1992)).
108 Id.
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presumption that a jury will find more often for the plaintiff than would an
experienced decisionmaker is seriously challenged. Also, so few cases are
determined by juries that providers' fear of a jury's power is irrational. 10 9 If
consumers are going to their constitutional right to a jury trial and its
benefits, the reason should be justified. It should not be based on the
unsupported fears of the medical community.
Furthermore, resolution without a jury may lead to disproportionately
lower damage awards. This is particularly troubling when a case like
Shirley Smith's is considered." 0 Ms. Smith was a Kaiser patient who
visited a Kaiser facility for over three years complaining about a lump in
her breast."' Kaiser took no action, so after Smith began to experience leg
pains and muscle weakness, she switched to another HMO, where a doctor
immediately hospitalized her." 2 The cancer that began in her breast had
spread to her lungs and bones.113 She died at age 42. Her parents filed a
wrongful death suit against Kaiser, which was referred to an arbitration
panel.114 In its vigorous defense, Kaiser claimed that its treatment of Smith
had met acceptable standards." 5 The panel awarded only $40,000 to
Smith's family. 116 The damage award was barely enough to cover the legal
fees and it was grossly inferior to the norm.117
Advocates for arbitration want to ignore the important role that juries
and the courts have played in regulating the quality of health care. 118
Advancements in informed consent, the standard of care, and professional
accountability have all resulted from the tort system.119 Before juries are
109 Metzloff, supra note 25, at 433. Only 10% of all medical malpractice claims are
determined by juries. Id See also Metzloff, supra note 21, at 82-84 (illustrating through
statistical analysis why it is difficult to prove that there is bias in jury decisions).
110 Groves, supra note 67, at A-4.
111 Id.
112 id.
113 id.
114 id.
115 Groves, supra note 67, at A-4. In medical malpractice, plaintiffs bear the burden of
proving that the defendant doctor failed to perform up to a national standard of medical
practice. See BARRY R. FPR~OW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 360 (1995).
116 Groves, supra note 67, at A-4.
117 Id. In 1991, the midpoint verdict for a wrongful death suit was $602,000, over ten
times the amount the Smiths received. "Wrongful death" is defined as improper diagnosis,
improperly performed surgery, or an inappropriate diagnosis. TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE
PROVIDER LIABiLTY: AN ANALYSIS OF JURY VERDICTS 18 (Brian Shenker ed., 1992).
118 See, e.g., Nicholas P. Terry, 7Te Technical and Conceptual Flaws of Medical
Malpractice Arbitration, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 571, 575 (1986).
119 Terry, supra note 119, at 578.
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completely dismissed from medical malpractice, policymakers should
consider the positive role juries have played in reshaping medical
professional responsibility.
V. How SHOULD ARBITRATION BE USED FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS IN THE MANAGED CARE ENVIRONMENT?
Before health care reform combines arbitration with managed care and
dispenses it to the American public, the conflict between the benefits of
arbitration and our legal ideals should be resolved. Health care reform
should not cost consumers their contractual and constitutional rights.
Support for arbitration is not unanimous, nor is it without limits. Clues
on how to prevent consumer harm can actually be gathered from the
common law and state statutes. Fair and effective arbitration in the managed
care setting should have three goals: (1) eliminating the adhesive quality of
arbitration agreements in managed care enrollment contracts; (2) eliminating
the bias in arbitration panels; and (3) promoting consumers' understanding
of arbitration agreements.
A. Eliminating the Adhesive Quality of Arbitration Agreements
Recently, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma broke from the Madden
precedent and refused to enforce a signed arbitration agreement in an HMO
membership contract.120 The court held that the agreement to arbitrate was
not enforceable because it bound the enrollee to arbitrate any future
contractual disputes.121 The court objected to the agreement's absolute
requirement of arbitration. 122 The court held this provision to be void under
Oklahoma law, which provides that any condition in a contract which
restricts a party from enforcing his rights under the contract by the usual
legal proceedings is void. 123 Even the petitioner's knowledge and
understanding of the arbitration provision was insufficient to sway the court
in favor of enforcing the provision. 124 The court held that precontroversy
arbitration agreements are unenforceable because they deny courts
jurisdiction and are contrary to public policy.125
The Oklahoma court made a valid point that pretreatment agreements to
arbitrate are not amenable to American public policy. Pretreatment
120 Cannon v. Lane, 867 P.2d 1235, 1238 (Okla. 1993).
121 id.
12 2 d
123 Id. at 1238-39.
'24 Id. at 1239.
125 Cannon, 867 P.2d at 1238.
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agreements can be adhesive because they lock consumers into arbitration
before they know if and how they may be injured. A number of states
prohibit pretreatment agreements to arbitrate medical malpractice claims. 126
In Georgia, "no agreement to arbitrate shall be enforceable unless the
agreement was made subsequent to the alleged negligence and after a
dispute or controversy has occurred . "127 In Alabama, pretreatment
arbitration agreements are also. 128 These statutes and the Oklahoma case
indicate that adhesive pretreatment agreements may be contrary to American
public policy.
The solution may be to provide some options to those who object to the
arbitration agreement at the time of signing the enrollment contract. This
would avoid the problem of the "take-it-or-leave-it" adhesion element of the
enrollment contract. 129 The managed care provider could offer consumers
the option of agreeing to a reasonable cap on recovery damages, if the
consumer refuses to sign the arbitration clause. 130 Caps on recovery may be
a better solution to the malpractice dilemma. According to a recent study by
the Office of Technological Assessment, the one tort reform that reduced
malpractice costs was the placing of caps on noneconomic damages. 131
Under this option, the HMO would face only limited liability and the
plaintiff would not be locked into an adhesive contract.
Another option the managed care provider could offer is a slightly
higher-priced plan, with no obligation to sign an arbitration provision.
Because managed care providers claim that arbitration is necessary to help
cut costs, the extra fee allows the provider to make up losses they may face
without arbitration. In this way, those who strenuously object to arbitration
can still sign a managed care enrollment contract and receive care, but are
not locked into arbitration.
126 The rationale behind such limitations is to protect consumers and patients from
having to sign contracts blindly. Prior to treatment, a patient is unable to foresee any possible
injuries and if she will desire a jury trial.
127 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-62 (1994).
128 ALA. CODE § 6-5-485(A) (1994).
129 See supra Part III.A. 1.
130 In order to determine what is a reasonable level, the HMO should use a statistical
mean for a specific injury. For example, if the average damage award for doctor malpractice
which results in brain damage is $600,000, then the cap limits what the decisionmaker can
award to the injured plaintiff to $600,000. See TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE PROVIDER
LIABILITY: AN ANALYSIS OF JURY VERDICTS 19 (Brian Shenker ed., 1992) (illustrating
liability through statistical analysis of jury verdicts).
131 Health Care Reform Hearing, supra note 7, at 3.
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B. Eliminating the Bias in Arbitration Panels
Arbitration can meet our constitutional expectations if some of the bias
within the arbitration panel is alleviated.132 Unlike a jury trial, a medical
practitioner is required on many medical malpractice arbitration panels. 133
Thus, the plaintiff is subject to a strong bias that is generally weeded out of
a courtroom jury by use of peremptory challenges. When the bias within the
panel is removed, then the arbitration panel is more like a jury, which is
more palatable to our Seventh Amendment priorities. Arbitration is viewed
as an "unqualified success" in the eyes of medical practitioners because it is
less favorable than the courtroom for the plaintiff. 34 Arbitration is less
satisfactory forum for plaintiffs because of limited discovery, the bias of a
health care provider on the panel, and the emphasis on compromise. t35 If
the constitution requires that the advantages of the court system be
preserved, then arbitration is inadequate. 136
One solution would be simply to eliminate the medical care provider
from the panel. Yet, having a medical practitioner on the panel is an
efficient way to save time and money. A more viable solution should
attempt to eliminate the inherent bias the medical care provider presents.
This could be achieved in various ways. First, the arbitration clause should
require that the panel member be a medical care provider who practices in a
different region than the defendant.137 For example, it would be highly
prejudicial if the defendant and the panel member were fellow staff
members at the local Kaiser hospital. Second, the arbitration provision
should establish stricter procedural rules regarding the amount of influence
the medical care provider can have on the other arbitrators. For instance,
the medical expert arbitrator should not be allowed to assume a persuasive
position similar to a medical expert witness. If the panel members have
questions regarding the medical issues at hand, the medical expert arbitrator
should not be looked to for all the answers. If the medical practitioner can
be removed as a source of bias, then the arbitration process can benefit from
the expert's knowledge without suffering from her partiality.
132 See Metzloff, supra note 25, at 434; see also Schor, supra note 26, at 79.
133 Saunders, supra note 79, at 278; see also discussion about Kaiser supra Part Il.B.
134 See Law, supra note 36, at 318. Furthermore, arbitrators are less likely to find for a
claimant if there is any doubt about liability. Ladimer, supra note 78, at 45 1.
135 Law, supra note 36, at 318.
136 Saunders, supra note 79, at 280.
137 The preferred location for a medical expert arbitrator would be a similar locality
with similar medical technology and knowledge.
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C. Promoting Consumers' Understanding of Arbitration Agreements
The biggest flaws in the Kaiser agreement to arbitrate are those
associated with the contract's inability to communicate its purpose. 138
Managed care providers should not be allowed to capitalize on consumers'
ignorance of arbitration. If the courts are going to adhere to the traditional
rule of contracts that one is bound to what one signs, then managed care
providers should bear the duty of notice to consumers. 139
There are several ways in which a fair agreement to arbitrate can
promote consumers' understanding of arbitration. The first way is to clearly
define arbitration. The agreement to arbitrate should be written so that an
ordinary person in the enrollee's shoes would not expect a jury trial. 140
Ideally when a conflict arises, a consumer should not be surprised when
arbitration is required.
Yet, merely including the definition of arbitration is not enough. The
agreement should also put the consumer on notice that any medical
malpractice claim a consumer may have against the managed care provider
will be resolved by arbitration. Notice of arbitration is a goal that several
state statutes have seen fit to establish. In California, arbitration agreements
in medical service contracts must meet certain disclosure qualifications.141
Immediately before the enrollee's signature line, a statement notifying the
signatory that they are giving up their right to a jury trial must appear in
ten-point bold red type. 142 A New York statute specifically requires that
HMOs inform subscribers of the effect of arbitration on their right to a jury
trial and their right of recission. 143 In South Carolina, if specific notice
requirements are not prominently displayed on the contract as required, then
138 See supra Part lIH.C.
139 This would avoid the unfairness that occurred in Leong. The court held that even
though the plaintiffs were not aware of the arbitration provision because it did not exist at the
time of their initial enrollment, they were still bound to it. Leong v. Kaiser Found. Hosps.,
788 P.2d 164, 168 (Haw. 1990).
140 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 4406(a) (McKinney 1986). See also ALASKA STAT. §
9.55.535 (1994) (mandating that the agreement to arbitrate must be clearly provided in bold
print on face of agreement).
141 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(b) (West 1993). Yet, section 1295(t) may exempt
liMOs and other managed care groups from the notice requirements. This would explain why
the Kaiser contract, which is still enforced in California, does not meet the requirements listed
in 1295(b).
14 2 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295(b) (West 1993).
143 Thus, in New York, all claims pursuant to an HMO contract are subject to
arbitration where the patient has signed an arbitration agreement or has failed to sign an
arbitration declination form. BANNON, supra note 41, at 15.
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arbitration cannot be compelled.1 44 As these states have found, notice
requirements are an effective way to guard against unfair agreements to
arbitrate. If the legislature adopts an arbitration policy as part of health care
reform, such state statutes incorporating notice should serve as models for a
national standard.
An arbitration agreement that aims to promote consumers'
understanding should also allow consumers an opportunity to change their
minds and rescind their acceptance of the contract. Most states allow for a
period of recission, usually thirty, sixty, or ninety days.145 This is
calculated from the last date of treatment. The right to recission gives
patients an opportunity to carefully consider their decision and take into
account new factors in their decision-making process. 146
In summary, a desirable arbitration agreement is one that defines
arbitration, puts consumers on notice as to how it will affect their rights,
and gives consumers an opportunity to rescind their agreement. These
goals, combined with the successful elimination of the adhesive quality of
many arbitration agreements as well as the bias in arbitration panels, can
make the combination of arbitration and managed care compatible with
consumers' contractual and constitutional rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
While it is difficult to predict exactly what kind of health care reform
will emerge from the legislature, the trend toward managed care is likely to
continue.147 The cost-conscious character of managed care will likely
increase the amount of patient harm, which will in turn increase the number
of medical malpractice claims and the need for malpractice reform. Backed
by cost and time benefits, as well as support from the courts, arbitration
will emerge as a solution to handle efficiently the increased number of
medical malpractice claims. Legislators may look to Kaiser as a model of
how to use arbitration in the managed care environment, but the Kaiser
144 "A contract subject to arbitration shall be typed in underlined capital letters, or
rubber-stamped prominently, on the first page of the contract. If such notice is not displayed,
the contract is not subject to arbitration." S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10 (Law. Co-op 1993).
145 See ALAsKA STAT. § 9.55.535(c) (1994) (allowing for 30 day period for recission);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-403(3) (1994) (allowing 90 day period for recission); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 2711.23(b) (Baldwin 1994). See also BANNON, supra note 41, at 11-16 (listing
statutes which allow for patient right to rescind).
146 See discussion supra Part II.C.
147 Even without reform, it is estimated that managed care will comprise almost 80% of
the health care market. Sherman, supra note 5, at 36 (quoting Lawrence Gostin, Executive
Director of the American Society of Law, Medicine, and Ethics).
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system is not without flaws. The benefits of arbitration cannot blind
policymakers to the contractual and constitutional concerns of mandating the
use of arbitration in the managed care setting. Arbitration must be instituted
with an eye toward preventing consumer harm. Health care reform should
not cost consumers their contractual and constitutional rights.
Amy E. Elliott
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